Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
In many industries consumer demand is characterized by pronounced network e¤ects, as e.g., in software and telecommunications markets. With network e¤ects consumers'utility is increasing in the total number of consumers adopting the same (and hence, compatible) product. Network e¤ects have produced intense debates in policy circles concerning the appropriate application of traditional competition policy concepts (see, e.g., OECD, 1997, and FTC, 1996) . Put simply, a consensus has been reached concerning the desirability of compatibility (besides possibly adverse dynamic e¤ects), whereas the assessment of market outcomes when products are incompatible remains largely unresolved (see also Klemperer, 2005) . Ambiguities under incompatibility arise as on the one hand pronounced network e¤ects may tip the market into a monopoly equilibrium (which appears to be an unfortunate outcome from a traditional competition policy point of view) while on the other hand a market sharing outcome where incompatible products compete head-to-head necessarily involves substantial incompatibilities among consumers (an outcome being obviously ine¢ cient).
Our paper is largely supportive of those considerations. Our main contribution is to show that (at least some) of the ambiguities concerning the policy assessment of competition under incompatible products can be attributed to a fundamental con ‡ict between consumer welfare and social welfare. We consider a simple Bertrand duopoly model with positive network e¤ects and analyze both compatible and incompatible products. We search for ful…lled expectation Bertrand equilibria where consumers hold rational expectations. If products are incompatible, a symmetric equilibrium (where …rms share the market equally) and two asymmetric equilibria (where one of the …rms becomes the monopolist) coexist. While consumers prefer the symmetric equilibrium (where price competition is most intense), a social planer would prefer either one of the monopoly equilibria (where network e¤ects are maximized). Moreover, the fundamental con ‡ict between consumer surplus and social welfare maximization becomes stronger the larger the network e¤ects in the industry. We also analyze the case of compatible products where a continuum of equilibria (ranging from complete monopolization to equal market sharing) emerge. Consumer surplus and social welfare are the same in all equilibria under compatibility.
Moreover, consumer surplus and social welfare is always (weakly) higher under compatibility when compared with the equilibrium outcomes under incompatibility. Unfortunately, …rms 2 never have strict incentives to achieve compatibility (irrespectively of whether side payments are allowed or not). We extend our analysis by considering horizontal product di¤erentiation which resolves the multiplicity of equilibria under compatibility such that a unique symmetric equilibrium emerges. We show that our results concerning the fundamental con ‡ict between consumer surplus and social welfare maximization under incompatibility and vis-à-vis …rms' insu¢ cient compatibility incentives remain valid, whenever network e¤ects are su¢ ciently large.
Taking a policy making perspective, our results are reassuring for governmental intervention that aims at increasing compatibility of …rms'(otherwise incompatible) products. Our results also highlight the ambiguity involved with those governmental interventions which aim at picking a winning proprietary technology out of incompatible competitors (e.g., by committing governmental procurement or standard setting to a single technology). 1 While such a policy can be advisable from a social welfare perspective, consumers may be substantially hurt. We speculate that our results are somehow supported by the fact that policy makers taking an industrial policy perspective (i.e., focus primarily on pro…ts) tend to prefer to pick a winning technology (out of a set of incompatible alternatives) while in competition policy circles (which are supposed to focus primarily on consumer surplus) a more reticent attitude appears to have gained control (as, e.g., expressed in FTC, 1996) . Our model may explain those di¤erences by the di¤erent weights the involved parties put on the elements of the social welfare function.
Our paper contributes to the industrial organization literature that analyzes how positive network e¤ects a¤ect competitive behavior and market performance (for a recent survey, see Farrell and Klemperer, 2007) . Our paper builds on the seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985) who examine network e¤ects in a Cournot model both under incompatibility and compatibility. We adopt their concept of a ful…lled expectation equilibrium to our set-up of duopolistic price competition. While we obtain similar equilibrium patterns, our contribution is to sharply highlight the described con ‡ict between consumer surplus and social welfare maximization when products are incompatible. 2 Closely related to our analysis is also Farrell and Saloner (1992) 1 A recent example for this kind of intervention can be seen in the announcement of the EU to support DVB-H as the mobile-television standard over rival technologies, as e.g., Qualcomm's MediaFLO ("EU Opts for DVB-H as Mobile-TV Standard," The Wall Street Journal Europe, March 18, 2008, p. 5). who analyze how the presence of (imperfect) converters a¤ects equilibrium outcomes in a model of horizontally di¤erentiated products and network e¤ects under di¤erent market structures. Farrell and Saloner (1992) consider both standardization and incompatibility outcomes (which correspond to the asymmetric and symmetric equilibrium outcomes, respectively, in our model) when product supply is perfectly competitive. However, they focus exclusively on the "conversion equilibrium" (i.e., the equilibrium where some consumers buy converters) under duopoly competition. In contrast, our main concern is the comparison of the asymmetric (standardization) equilibria with the symmetric (incompatibility) equilibrium when two incompatible proprietary technologies compete against each other. Farrell and Saloner (1992) argue that the existence of (imperfect) converters makes a standardization outcome less likely, so that overall incompatibilities tend to be larger with converters. They interpret their …nding as an ine¢ ciency due to the irresponsibility of competition. In those instances, "[i]t might be better if some good were not o¤ered at all, or were o¤ered only at a high price, because consumers use it 'irresponsibly'; but with competition, no agent can decide that a good will not be o¤ered, or that its price shall be high" (Farrell and Saloner, 1992, p. 13) . Accordingly, our model also contributes to that literature which highlights con ‡icts between the maximization of social welfare and consumer welfare, an issue which is important as competition policy tends to be preoccupied with protecting consumer surplus, and thereby, either assumes that consumer protection should be aligned with social welfare maximization or simply neglects overall e¢ ciency. Similar to excessive entry results (e.g., in the standard Cournot model or under monopolistic competition, Salop, 1979) we obtain that competition between incompatible products can give rise to market outcomes where consumers prefer a market sharing outcome (with substantial incompatibilities prevailing) which is ine¢ cient from a social welfare perspective when compared with the monopoly outcome.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present our basic Bertrand duopoly model with network e¤ects. Section 3 presents the analysis and the main results of our basic model. In Section 4 we examine the case of horizontally di¤erentiated products. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
set-up, it is also blurred by the features of the underlying Cournot model (in particular, the dependence of total demand on …rms'quantity choices).
2 The Model
We consider a Bertrand duopoly, where products exhibit positive network e¤ects. Products may be either compatible or incompatible with each other. Each …rm i (i = A; B) produces with constant marginal cost (which we normalize to zero). Firms compete in prices p i (i = A; B) which they determine simultaneously. We assume consumer utility to be linearly increasing in the network size, so that each additional consumer creates a constant positive externality, b > 0, to the utility of the users of the same product under incompatibility or all consumers under compatibility. We assume a continuum of consumers with a mass of one. The …rms' market shares are denoted by i 2 [0; 1] (i = A; B). The utility of a consumer from buying product i = A; B when products are incompatible is given by
with v > 0 denoting the stand-alone value of the product. Similarly, the utility from buying product i = A; B is given by U (p i ; A + B ) when products are compatible.
As consumers'utilities are interdependent because of positive network e¤ects, they have to form expectations about the other consumers'purchasing decisions, and hence, about each …rm i's future market share which we denote by e i . For given consumer expectations and prices, we can express the demand for product i under incompatibility as
with i; j = A; B and i 6 = j. The demand function for product i when products are compatible follows from replacing U (p i ; e i ) and U (p j ; e j ) by U (p i ; e A + e B ) and U (p j ; e A + e B ), respectively. The timing of our basic market game is as follows. In the …rst stage, consumers form expectations and …rms set prices. In the second stage, consumers observe …rms'pricing decisions and make their purchasing decisions. We search for ful…lled expectation Bertrand equilibria. 3 In a ful…lled expectation Bertrand equilibrium each …rm's price maximizes its pro…t i (p i ; p j ; e i ) = p i q i (p i ; p j; e i ) (i; j = A; B, i 6 = j) for a given price of the rival …rm and for given consumer expectations. In addition, we require rational expectations so that each …rm's equilibrium market 3 Our concept of a ful…lled expectations equilibrium is borrowed from Katz and Shapiro (1985) . 5 share equals its expected one. More precisely, in a ful…lled expectation Bertrand equilibrium, consumer expectations are ful…lled (i.e., e i = i for i = A; B) and equilibrium prices p i follow from
In the following we simply refer to the ful…lled expectation Bertrand equilibrium as to the equilibrium.
Analysis and Main Results
We now present the main results of our equilibrium analysis. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium when products are incompatible.
Proposition 1. If products are incompatible, then a symmetric and two asymmetric equilibria exist. In the asymmetric equilibria one of the …rms gains the whole market, sets its price equal to b, while the other …rm cannot do better than setting its price equal to zero. In the symmetric equilibrium …rms share the market equally and set their prices equal to zero.
Proof. We consider all possible market sharing outcomes and ask whether a particular outcome can be supported as an equilibrium. We …rst analyze the asymmetric outcome where one …rm becomes the monopolist, then the symmetric outcome, and …nally all other constellations.
Case i) Suppose that i = 1 (i = A; B) constitutes an equilibrium outcome. As expectations are supposed to be ful…lled, e i = 1 must also hold. From (1) we obtain that i = 1 is only feasible if U (p i ; 1) U (p j ; 0) for i 6 = j. Note that p i must be the solution of the maximization
i could increase its pro…t by decreasing its price. Accordingly, p j must also be the solution of the maximization problem (2). Hence, it must hold that p j = 0, as otherwise (if p j > 0), …rm j could increase its pro…t by setting the price
and p j = 0 it follows that p i = b. As U (b; 1) = v we conclude that i = 1 (i = A; B) constitutes an equilibrium outcome with equilibrium prices p i = b and p j = 0 (j 6 = i).
Case ii) Suppose the symmetric outcome A = B > 0 constitutes an equilibrium. With ful…lled expectations, e i = i (i = A; B) must also hold. From (1) it follows that A = B > 0 is only feasible if U (p A ; A ) = U (p B ; B ). Hence, it follows that p A = p B must hold in a symmetric equilibrium. Solving the corresponding maximization problems (2) it must hold that p A = p B = 0, as otherwise (if p A = p B > 0) one of the …rms can increase its pro…t by decreasing its price slightly. As U (0; A ) > v holds, the market is covered in the symmetric equilibrium, and thus, A = B = 1=2 must hold. Hence, i = 1=2 is an equilibrium outcome with equilibrium prices p i = 0 (i = A; B).
Case iii) Assume now all asymmetric outcomes with i > j > 0 for i; j = A; B and i 6 = j.
As expectations must be ful…lled e i = i and e j = j must then hold as well. Applying the demand function (1) we obtain that i > j > 0 can only hold if U (p i ; i ) = U (p j ; j ). It is now easily checked that no prices p i ; p j 0 exist which can support such an equilibrium outcome. Note …rst that p i > p j must hold, as otherwise, Proposition 1 states that three equilibria exist under incompatibility: two asymmetric equilibria where one …rm gains the entire market (with i = 1, i = A; B) and a symmetric equilibrium where both …rms share the market equally (with i = 1=2 , i = A; B). In the asymmetric equilibria the monopolist sets a price of p i = b while the losing competitor cannot do better than setting p j = 0 (j 6 = i). In the symmetric equilibrium we obtain the Bertrand paradox, such that both …rms set their prices equal to their marginal costs (i.e., p A = p B = 0).
With Proposition 1 at hand we can now evaluate consumer surplus and social welfare in the di¤erent equilibria under incompatibility. We denote consumer surplus (i.e., the integral over consumers' utilities) by CS and social welfare (i.e., the sum of consumer surplus and …rms' pro…ts) by SC. In the following we use the superscript "a" to indicate the asymmetric equilibrium and the superscript "s"to indicate the symmetric equilibrium under incompatibility.
Proposition 2. Consumer surplus in the symmetric (asymmetric) equilibrium is given by v + b=2 ( v) and social welfare in the symmetric (asymmetric) equilibrium is given by v + b=2
Hence, social welfare is highest in the asymmetric equilibria whereas consumer surplus is highest in the symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, the total value of the di¤ erences of social welfare and consumer surplus under the symmetric and the asymmetric equilibrium is strictly increasing in the level of the network e¤ ect, b.
Proof. In the asymmetric equilibrium we obtain CS a = v and SW a = v + b, where in the latter expression b is the pro…t of the …rm which gains the entire market. In the symmetric equilibrium we obtain CS s = v + b=2 and SW s = v + b=2. Calculating the di¤erences we get CS s CS a = SW a SW s = b=2, which are both increasing in the level of the network e¤ect,
Our results indicate the basic trade-o¤ between the maximization of social welfare and consumer surplus in the presence of the network e¤ects, whenever products are incompatible. While social welfare maximization requires consumers to coordinate on a single product, consumers are better o¤ when both products compete head-to-head. In an asymmetric equilibrium the expected monopolist has a competitive advantage vis-à-vis its rival given by the amount of the overall network e¤ects it provides, namely, b. That advantage gives the monopolist the opportunity to extract all the consumer surplus generated by the network e¤ects, b. In contrast, in the symmetric equilibrium none of the …rms has a similar (expectational) advantage and thus both …rms compete all pro…ts away. The resulting lower price in the symmetric equilibrium overcompensates consumers'losses from lower network e¤ects. The higher social surplus in the asymmetric equilibrium is due to that fact that network e¤ects are maximized in that case. Proposition 2 also states that the con ‡ict between consumer surplus and social welfare maximization becomes more severe with increasing levels of the network e¤ect, b. Therefore, when network e¤ects are large then any equilibrium involves considerable losses either from a consumer surplus or social welfare point of view.
We now turn to the equilibrium analysis under compatibility (where we indicate equilibrium values by the superscript "c"). Proof. Under compatibility consumer expectations about network e¤ects are the same for both products and the expected utility from buying from …rm i = A; B is given by U (p i ; e A + e B ) = v + b( e A + e B ) p i . We show that p c A , p c B = 0 must hold in equilibrium. Assume to the contrary that equilibrium prices ful…ll p i > p j > 0. Then …rm i could increase its pro…t by setting p i = p j , > 0. Assume next that p i > p j = 0. Then …rm j could increase its pro…t by setting p j = p i , > 0. Assume …nally that p i = p j > 0. Then at least one of the …rms can increase its pro…t by slightly reducing its price. 4 If p i = p j = 0, then none of the …rms has a strict incentive to alter its price. As expectations must be ful…lled, the market share of …rm i is
given by e i = c i 2 [0; 1] (i = A; B). Moreover, the market is covered in equilibrium as for any Corollary 1 states that both consumer surplus and social welfare are always maximized under compatibility. Social welfare and consumer surplus are, therefore, perfectly aligned under compatibility. As products are compatible, network e¤ects are always maximized, and consumers always enjoy the bene…ts from homogenous goods Bertrand competition. According to Corollary 1 a switch from incompatibility to compatibility is bene…cial from a consumer surplus as well as from a social welfare perspective. We note that our results give a sharper prediction than Katz and Shapiro (1985) who obtain an ambiguous comparison of social welfare under incompatibility and compatibility which is due to the fact that …rms'pro…ts may decrease under compatibility (and that this decrease is not necessarily compensated by the unambiguously increasing consumer surplus). 4 Note that if e j = 1, then only …rm i has an incentive to reduce its price (with i; j = A; B and i 6 = j).
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Turning …nally to …rm's incentives to achieve compatibility in the …rst place we obtain the following result.
Corollary 2. Firms never have a strict incentive to achieve compatibility independently on whether or not side payments are feasible.
Corollary 2 follows immediately from comparing …rms'pro…ts in the compatibility and incompatibility equilibria. The corollary states that …rms can never do better under compatibility when compared with incompatibility. The statement holds for all possible equilibrium outcomes under incompatibility and compatibility. In fact, the expected monopolist under incompatibility has a strict incentive to block any move towards compatibility. Moreover, this result does not depend on whether or not side payments are admissible. A similar result has been obtained in Katz and Shapiro (1985) when an asymmetric equilibrium emerges under incompatibility.
However, they also show signi…cant incentives to achieve compatibility if the symmetric equilibrium is valid under incompatibility. Our model, therefore, gives a much gloomier picture on …rms' compatibility incentives. We may interpret our results such that an active role of the government to achieve more compatibility among …rms' (proprietary) technologies can be advisable if network e¤ects are substantial. If, however, increasing compatibility is not a viable policy option, then picking a winning technology involves a fundamental trade-o¤ between social welfare (or, equivalently, producer surplus) maximization (i.e., industrial policy concerns) and consumer surplus maximization (i.e., competition policy concerns); a con ‡ict that becomes more pronounced the larger network e¤ects become.
Horizontal Product Di¤erentiation
In this section we consider the case where …rms' products are horizontally di¤erentiated à la Hotelling. The timing of the market game is the same as in our basic Bertrand duopoly model.
Consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the unit interval such that each consumer obtains an address x 2 [0; 1]. The utility a consumer with address x derives from consuming product A is given by U A x (p A ; A ) = v + b A tx p A and from consuming product B is given by U B x (p B ; B ) = v + b B t(1 x) p B , where i and p i (i = A; B) stand for …rm i's market share and price, respectively, while v is the stand-alone value which is assumed to be su¢ ciently large, so that the market is always covered in equilibrium. We may then express the demand for product i = A; B for given consumer expectations and …rms'prices as
with i; j = A; B and i 6 = j. We start with the analysis of the symmetric equilibrium. Given the demand for …rm i's (i = A; B) product and the price of the rival …rm j (j 6 = i) each …rm i in a market sharing equilibrium sets its price according to the maximization problem (2) which
1)=3. Imposing our requirement that expectations are ful…lled in equilibrium so that e i = q i (p i ( e i ); p j ( e j ); e i ) for i; j = A; B and i 6 = j must hold, we obtain the equilibrium output levels and prices with q i = 1=2 and p i = t, respectively. As each …rm's maximization problem is strictly concave and q i and p i are positive for any values of b and t we conclude that a unique symmetric equilibrium exists for any t; b > 0.
Let us now turn to the asymmetric equilibria where …rm i (i = A; B) becomes the monopolist.
As we assume that the market is always covered (i.e., we pose v to be su¢ ciently large) prices must ful…ll p i = b t and p j = 0 (j 6 = i) in an asymmetric equilibrium when …rm i (i = A; B) becomes the monopolist. Those prices constitute an equilibrium only if …rm i does not have an incentive to increase its price, so that
must hold in an asymmetric equilibrium. Evaluating Condition (4) we obtain the parameter restriction b 3t. We are now in a position to state the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose products are horizontally di¤ erentiated and incompatible. Then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which each …rm i ( i = A; B) sets the price p s i = t and serves half of the market. If network e¤ ects are large enough, i.e., b 3t, then two asymmetric equilibria also exist in which …rm i ( i = A; B) gains the entire market and sets the price p a i = b t while the losing rival …rm cannot do better than setting p a j = 0 (with i 6 = j).
If network e¤ects are relatively small (or, conversely, products are quite di¤erentiated), then only the symmetric equilibrium emerges (i.e., if b < 3t holds), while for larger network e¤ects (or, rather homogeneous products) also two asymmetric equilibria emerge (i.e., if b 3t). Product di¤erentiation, therefore, tends to make a symmetric equilibrium outcome more likely under incompatibility when compared with our previous basic model where products were assumed to be (inherently) symmetric. With Proposition 4 at hand, we can next compare consumer surplus and total welfare when both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria coexist (i.e., if b 3t). 5
Proposition 5. Suppose products are horizontally di¤ erentiated and incompatible. Moreover, assume that b 3t so that both a unique symmetric and two asymmetric equilibria coexist. Then there exists a con ‡ict between social welfare and consumer surplus if b > 7t=2, such that social welfare is highest in the asymmetric equilibria and consumer surplus is highest in the symmetric equilibrium. If, otherwise, 3t b 7t=2, then no con ‡ict arises such that consumer surplus and social welfare are highest in the asymmetric equilibrium.
Proof. In the asymmetric equilibrium under incompatibility consumer surplus is given by CS a = v + t=2 and social welfare is given by SW a = v + b t=2. In the symmetric equilibrium under incompatibility consumer surplus is given by CS s = v + b=2 5t=4 while social welfare is given by SW s = v + b=2 t=4. It is easily checked that v + b t=2 > v + b=2 t=4 for any t and b if b 3t, while from comparing CS s and CS a we obtain that CS s > CS a if b > 7t=2, whereas the opposite holds for b < 7t=2. Q.E.D.
Considering the di¤erences CS s CS a = (2b 7t)=4 and SW a SW s = (2b t)=4 we observe that both di¤erences increase in b. We can, therefore, conclude that with increasing network e¤ects the asymmetric equilibrium becomes less attractive from a consumer perspective but more attractive from a social welfare point of view. According to Proposition 5, if network e¤ects are strong (or product di¤erentiation is weak), such that b > 7t=2 holds, then the con ‡ict between consumer surplus and social welfare is preserved under product di¤erentiation. Interestingly enough, Proposition 5 also shows the existence of an intermediate parameter range (3t b 7t=2), where both social welfare and consumer surplus are aligned and jointly maximized in the asymmetric equilibrium. In that area, one …rm, say …rm A, can only gain the entire market with a "predatory" price which makes the consumer at the other end of the Hotelling line at least indi¤erent between buying …rm A's product (which creates a disutility of t but gives rise to network utility b) or …rm B's product which is o¤ered at a price of zero (but lacks any network utility).
We now turn to the case when …rms'products are compatible. In this case the utility from the product of …rm i is given by U i (p i ; 1) (i = A; B). The following proposition characterizes the associated equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 6. Suppose products are horizontally di¤ erentiated and compatible. Then a unique symmetric equilibrium emerges in which each …rm sets the price p c i = t ( i = A; B) and serves half of the market. Consumer surplus and social welfare are given by CS c = v + b 5t=4 and
Proof. Let us …rst consider the symmetric equilibrium. In the symmetric equilibrium each …rm maximizes its pro…t given by [1=2 + (p j p i )=2t]p i for a given price of its competitor p j (i = A; B, i 6 = j). We then obtain that each …rm sets the price p c i = t (i = A; B) and …rms share the market equally. Consumer surplus and social welfare are then given by CS c = v + b 5t=4
and SW c = v + b t=4, respectively.
We prove now that an asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist under compatibility. Assume, to the contrary, that …rm A holds a monopoly position in equilibrium. Then, it must hold that U A (p A ; x = 1) = U B (p B ; x = 1), as otherwise …rm A cannot gain the entire market. It is then immediate that p B = 0 must hold as well, as otherwise, …rm B could increase its pro…t by decreasing its price slightly. Hence, it follows that p A = t < 0 must hold, an outcome obviously not admissible. Q.E.D.
We are now in a position to compare consumer surplus, social welfare and …rms'pro…ts in the di¤erent equilibria under incompatibility with the equilibrium under compatibility. Clearly, SW c = v + b t=4 is larger than both SW a = v + b t=2 and SW s = v + b=2 t=4, so that social welfare is (strictly) maximized whenever products are compatible. It is straightforward to check that consumer surplus under compatibility CS c = v + b 5t=4 is always larger than consumer surplus in the symmetric equilibrium under incompatibility CS s = v + b=2 5t=4.
Moreover, for those parameter constellations, where both two asymmetric equilibria and a symmetric equilibrium under incompatibility emerge (i.e., b 3t) it holds that CS c > CS a = v +t=2 as v + b 5t=4 > v + t=2 holds for any b > 7t=4. Hence, whenever an asymmetric equilibrium under incompatibility exists, then consumer surplus is higher under compatibility. The following 13 corollary summarizes our results.
Corollary 3. Suppose that products are di¤ erentiated and multiple equilibria emerge under incompatibility (i.e., b 3t holds). Then the ordering of consumer surplus and social welfare under compatible and incompatible products is such that SW c > SW a > SW s and CS c > max fCS a ; CS s g with CS a > CS s for all 3t b < 7t=2 and CS s > CS a for all b > 7t=2. If, otherwise, b < 3t, then SW c > SW s and CS c > CS s .
Corollary 3 states that both social welfare and consumer surplus are highest under compatibility independently of the type of equilibrium under incompatibility. In contrast to our basic model in the previous section, we also obtain that social welfare is now strictly higher under compatibility when compared with the asymmetric equilibrium outcome under incompatibility. While the asymmetric outcome under incompatibility still maximizes network e¤ects it also entails welfare losses because of reduced product variety. As the latter loss is absent in the equilibrium under compatibility, social welfare is strictly higher under compatibility. We now turn to …rms'incentives to achieve compatibility.
Corollary 4. Suppose that products are di¤ erentiated. Then, …rms never have strict incentives to achieve compatibility, irrespectively on whether or not transfers are feasible.
Corollary 4 mirrors Corollary 2 such that product di¤erentiation does not a¤ect our result of our basic model that …rms cannot unilaterally or jointly improve (strictly) their pro…ts by making products compatible.
Conclusions
In this paper we have highlighted a fundamental con ‡ict between consumer surplus and social welfare maximization whenever products are incompatible and network e¤ects determine consumers'willingness to pay for a certain product. While consumers prefer market sharing because of the resulting lower prices, a monopoly outcome is preferable from a social welfare perspective as such an outcome maximizes overall network e¤ects. At the same time, a monopoly outcome tends to take competitive pressure out of the market so that consumers are worse o¤ when compared with the symmetric equilibrium where …rms share the market equally. The con ‡ict becomes more pronounced when network e¤ects become more important; a fact which is es-14 pecially true when products are di¤erentiated. Our results also show that private incentives for compatibility are largely absent, so that governmental intervention in that regard may be advisable.
Governmental intervention if compatibility is not a feasible policy option is less simple.
Public policy may try to tip the market into one of the monopoly equilibria (e.g., by committing public procurement or state-subsidized projects to a certain technology). While the resulting monopoly equilibrium may be preferable from a social welfare perspective, it may also unfold signi…cant negative impacts on consumer surplus.
